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Gleaning Information From Mandatory Livestock Price Reporting
Matthew A. Diersen

Abstract
Mandatory livestock price reporting has changed how prices are reported and
used by analysts and market participants. Reporting has affected the availability ofmany
reports and has added new reports and information. The new information often needs to
be put into a meaningful form for direct use by analysts and participants. A brief
overview ofthe evolution and implementation ofmandatory price reporting is given. The
new price reports are then discussed and compared to voluntary reports. Special
attention is given to new reports that give insights into the the short- and medium-run
cattle supply situation. As South Dakota had State-level reporting in place prior to the
Federal law, there is additional data and insights that put national observations into
perspective. While the focus is on cattle reports, swine reports are also briefly discussed
Key words: captive supply, cattle prices, hog prices, transparancy
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Gleaning Information From Mandatory Livestoc:k Pric:e Reporting

Price transparency refers to the level ofopenness of observed or available
transactions. As fundamental business practices have changed in the beef industry in
recent years, price transparency has come into question. Among the fundamental
changes are: a concentration ofbuyers and sellers of finished livestock, an increased
number of alliances, a lessened reliance on cash markets (specifically auction markets), a
shortened trading window for slaughter transactions, and an increased use of value-based
pricing (GIPSA, 2001). The result ofthese changes has been a reduced number of
transactions covered by traditional voluntary price reporting.
While reduced transparency does not have to imply reduced pricing efficiency, it
does call into question the timeliness and applicability of reported prices. Changing
business practices imply different price information may also be necessary for market
participants to make informed business decisions. Before mandatory reporting, producers
argued they were not able to quickly and easily obtain information to determine the best
possible price for their product. State legislatures responded by passing mandatory
reporting laws, requiring packers procuring livestock in the respective states to make
more market information accessible.
Passage ofthe Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 usurped various
regulations requiring packers to report transactions to state authorities. Under the
national law, large packers of cattle, swine, and sheep must report data from purchases
and processing with respect to price, volume, and grade. The U.S. Department of

Agricuhure's Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA-AMS) is responsible for
assembling and disseminating the reports.
The national law has resulted in the loss of some state-level market information
and presented problems because of inaccurate and incomplete data. National reporting
eliminated many state-specific reports released by USDA-AMS. For many states not
included in the current regional or state-specific reports, uncertainty now exists as to the
relevant price for decision-making, even when they have auction markets. Upon
implementation, producers had to look to other sources for bid and ask information,
which led to some concerns about the unbiased nature ofthe sources.
The relevancy of other information provided under national mandatory price
reporting has not been assessed at this time. Methods of disseminating the abundance of
new information in an understandable manner also need to be examined. With any new
information system there is also a concern over the internal consistency ofthe whole
system. Quite simply, will the numbers add up in a meaningful way and be reliable
enough to improve decision-making?
The purpose of this paper is to discern the information available under national
mandatory livestock price reporting. The focus will be primarily on cattle prices, with
some comparisons to swine reporting. Lamb and meat prices will not be covered. The
first aspect is the extent to which information may be lost because of discontinued
reports. This is relevant for most states not covered by the 5-Area reports. The early
reporting error will be covered next as its resolution affects many ofthe more meaningful
reports. An overview ofthe current breadth ofreports follows with particular attention
given to fonnula and forward contract prices.
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The committed and delivered and packer owned reports are then covered in detail
as they provide a significant amount of new, non-price information that should be useful
for gauging short- and medium-tenn supply situations. The implications from South
Dakota's reporting data are discussed when they relate to or further explain what may be
happening under national reporting. The swine reports are then briefly discussed
followed by implications for market analysts, market participants, and policymakers.

Review of Literature
Haley (200 1) provides a briefoverview ofthe legislation and early
implementation problems of mandatory price reporting. Because mandatory reporting is
new and was quickly implemented, there has been limited research to draw upon except
for studies that postulated what might happen under mandatory reporting. Koontz (1999)
compared closeout prices to voluntarily reported prices. He found that feedlots and
packers report prices to their advantage, suggesting that observed prices might not reflect
changes occurring in the market. He also suggests that because the closeout prices are
asymmetrically distributed, a median price would be more informative than a mean price.
Wachenheim and DeVuyst (2001) assess the potential for collusive packer
behavior under national mandatory price reporting. They present multiple arguments
both for and against the likelihood of collusion, with the level of aggregation in the
reported data as the most significant factor. Experimental economics offers evidence that
the level ofprice information provided influences market efficiency (Anderson et aI.,
1998), and that more forward pricing is likely under mandatory reporting (Bastian,
Koontz, and Menkhaus, 2001).
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USDA-AMS has several new beefreports that replaced their voluntary national
boxed beef cuts report. Shortly after implementation, a reporting error occurred when
several reports incorrectly aggregated prices of meat cuts into composite and cutout
values. Boxed beefprices were then understated and likely affected transaction prices for
live cattle and any derivations such as futures prices. After the announcement of the
error, the live and feeder cattle futures trade responded with sharp increases in prices.
The USDA oversaw an extensive review of the reporting error to determine the
cause and any potential market impacts (LMPR Review Team, 2001). The relationship
between the meat prices and live cattle prices was analyzed, but does not perhaps capture
the true nature ofthe relationship. The mistake affected packer margins but who gained
or lost is not readily evident. Following Owen, Sporleder, and Bessler (1991), meat and
cattle prices are related, but it remains unclear how the relationship would be affected by
the "drop" value and interactions of demand at the wholesale level. For a breakdown of
the relationship between boxed beef and live cattle prices see Ward, Schroeder, and Feuz
(2001). A possible contributing factor identified was the "3/60" guideline, implemented
to ensure that confidentiality was maintained, that limited a broad scope ofprices from
being reported (LMPR Review Team, 2001). Analysts may have been able to catch the
reporting error sooner with such prices. USDA-AMS now uses a "3/70/20" guideline, for
details see Haley (2001), and there is now much broader reporting.

Discontinued Reports
The switch from voluntary to mandatory reporting has had direct and indirect
consequences on price information. The scope ofthe problem is easily seen in that the
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following reports are no longer available: Montana Direct, South Dakota Direct,
California!ArizonalNevada Direct, Indiana/Michigan/Ohio Direct, Illinois Direct,
Wyoming/South DakotalNebraska Direct, and WashingtonlOregonlIdaho Direct.
Auction summaries and direct feeder cattle reports were unaffected by the switch to
mandatory reporting. The auction summaries may now contain the best, ifnot only,
reported prices ofslaughter-weight cattle that can be specifically tied to many locations.
The discontinued South Dakota reports were related to slaughter-weight cattle.
The "South Dakota Direct Slaughter Cattle" report was a daily summary ofeastern South
Dakota feedlot sales to packers. The "Wyoming, Western Nebraska, and Southwest
South Dakota Feedlot Sales" report was similar to the first report, but covered a smaller
region of South Dakota. Neither report resulted in both live and dressed quotes for all
days, as trade was often sporadic for a given type. Regardless, cattle feeders, packers,
and the rest ofthe industry used these reports for decision-making.
Given the loss ofthe price reporting specific to South Dakota, a concern exists
about which currently available price best reflects the price received in South Dakota for
slaughter animals. South Dakota's mandatory price reporting law, which passed in 1999,
applied to cattle, swine, and sheep purchased in the state (SDCL, 2000). South Dakota's
Department ofAgriculture collected prices during the enforcement period and made them
available to the public. South Dakota stopped collecting mandatory data after the
national law was implemented. A price series developed from the South Dakota data can
be compared to other prices in an effort to determine which price, ifany, can accurately
reflect information in the discontinued reports. The knowledge obtained from the

5

analysis should give insights into similar problems facing other states that no longer have
direct reports.
Two candidate prices for South Dakota are the Sioux Falls auction cash price and
the new Nebraska cash price. South Dakota mandatory live cattle prices were obtained
from September of 1999 through March of200 1. After sorting out slaughter steers and
heifers purchased for delivery within 7 days, a weekly weighted average price series was
developed. The S.D. mandatory price was then compared to the Sioux Falls price for
Choice #2-4, 1100-1300# slaughter steers and the Nebraska Direct accumulated average
live steer price (figure 1).

1- SD MaDdatory - - Sioux FaDs - - Nebraska 1
85~--------------------------------------------~

80*---------------------------------------~~~

651+------------------------~~~------------~

~+-~~~~~~_P_P~~~~~~~P__ _ _ _~
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Jao-OO

May-OO

Sep-OO

Jao-Ol

Sources: USDA-AMS, SD Dept of Ag, & SDSU
Figure 1. Weekly Reported South Dakota Slaughter Cattle Priees

The prices track one another quite closely, although there was a stronger

correlation between the S.D. mandatory price and the Sioux Falls price (.986) than for the
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S.D. mandatory price and the Nebraska price (.979) on a weekly basis. While further
analysis ofthis data is necessary to account for potential spurious correlation, the
preliminary observation is that the Sioux Falls price more accurately reflects market
conditions in South Dakota.

New Cattle Price Reports
While only a portion ofthe reports are highlighted here, a list ofall reports under
mandatory price reporting can be accessed at the USDA-AMS website,
www.ams.usda.gov. For slaughter cattle prices at the national level, USDA-AMS reports
information monthly, weekly, and muhiple times daily. Direct slaughter cattle purchases
by packers are broken down into negotiated, formulated, and forward contract reports.
Regional prices are available for Texas-Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and
Iowa-Minnesota to varying degrees. These states comprise the 5-Area reports. Cow and
bull price reports are available at the national level. A weekly report ofpremiums and
discounts rounds out the price reports.
The main difference in these new reports is the additional breakdown ofthe non
negotiated purchases. Thus, prices in these reports may allow for a reasonable
comparison ofthe prices paid for negotiated versus formulated cattle ofsimilar quality
sold at similar times. For example, the "National Weekly Direct Slaughter Cattle 
Negotiated Purchases" report gives information on 35-65% Choice steers purchased on a
live basis. Included is the number ofhead, dressing percentage, weight range, weighted
average weight, price range and weighted average price. The weighted average price can
be compared to similar classes ofslaughter animals purchased on a formulated or forward
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contract basis. For a discussion ofcommon transactions involving formula prices see
Ward, Feuz, and Schroeder (1998).
Comparisons of weekly purchased cattle are shown in figures 2 and 3 for the
fourth quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. The weighted average price for
domestic low-choice steers is shown in each figure and a similar pattern emerges for both
live and dressed purchases. Unanticipated low prices in December of2001 are reflected
in negotiated prices observed below forward contract prices for the time period. The
formula prices seem to lag the negotiated prices, which is understandable if the formulas
tie to observed cash prices. There seem to be relatively large swings in the forward
contract prices, perhaps because of thinness in this market segment.
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Formula -

Forwanl Contract I
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Figure 2. Weeldy Live Slaughter Cattle Prices
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Figure 3. Weekly Dressed Slaughter Cattle Prices

COlDlDitted and Delivered Cattle Reports
USDA-AMS also reports additional infonnation that was not available before
mandatory reporting. The committed and delivered cattle reports give summaries of
cattle classified by purchase type and by cattle type (steer, heifer, etc.). Specifically,
cattle to be delivered within the next seven days are considered committed. If a large
amount of cattle were reported as committed for a particular day, then one would know
that these cattle would be delivered sometime in the next week. This gives an indication
ofthe short-run supply conditions relevant for price discovery and efficient planning of
feedlot sales.
Looking at the total number committed and delivered clarifies daily patterns of
purchasing behavior in the industry. Packers purchase a large number of cattle on a given
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day ofthe week., then take delivery of a smoothed out number of head on a daily basis.
As shown in figure 4, there are typically spikes in the daily committed level and little

variability in the daily delivered level. Because of the difficulty ofpinpointing specific
cattle committed to the exact day they are delivered, running totals are necessary to see
how committed and delivered levels correspond to each other.

l:~_ Da.!IY Com. ---- 5-Day Com. - D~~D~L - 5-D~!.DeLJ
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2/4/02

2n1102 2/18102 2125102

3/4102

3n1102 3n8102 3125102

Sources: USDA-AMS & SDSU
Figure 4. Committed and Delivered Volume Comparison

Because USDA-AMS reports say committed cattle are "generally for slaughter in
7 days", a five-calendar-day tally is used to give a running total of committed and
delivered cattle. The S-day delivered total would roughly equal a moving total of weekly
slaughter (figure 4). The S-day committed total would give a strong indication of
whether or not packers are "short bought", meaning that a smallS-day committed total
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would say that packers need cattle to maintain slaughter plant efficiency and may be
willing to pay higher prices to achieve such efficiency. Such times would show as
valleys where the 5-day committed total is below the 5-day delivered total in figure 4.
While not shown, a longer running total ofcommitted runs close to running total of
delivered cattle, suggesting consistency ofthe data.
Another piece ofdata that may be useful is the breakdown ofthe committed and
delivered cattle from each state. A data set ofcommitted and delivered cattle from South
Dakota could be examined to show the supply coming from this state. Such a breakdown
might prove insightful for modeling temporal and spatial movements ofcattle.

Packer Owned Cattle Reports
The weekly packer owned report has slaughter volume and characteristics for
cattle owned by packers, but no prices. It also gives slaughter volume for cattle
slaughtered that were purchased the previous week under formulas and forward contracts.
In addition, it gives forward contract data by month that includes a head count and the
observed range ofbasis levels. The forward contract volume data is not new. USDA
AMS used to report a running total ofcontracted volume in the "Forward Contract
Slaughter Cattle" report. By gathering the amount and month ofcattle forward
contracted, with corresponding basis levels, it would be possible to gauge long-run
supply conditions.
Although the forward contract data are reported weekly, a monthly tally is
probably more appropriate for assessing contracting behavior. Monthly totals and a
cumulative total offorward contracted cattle for delivery in December of2001 are shown
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in figure 5. During August and October a relatively large number ofcattle were forward
contracted for December delivery, while the cumulative total increased at a steady pace.
Using the weekly average closing ofthe CME futures price with the reported basis levels,
it may be possible to infer the forward contract price at the time the contracts were
entered. Such prices could be matched against the eventual forward contract prices paid.
However, given the low volume ofhead forward contracted the usefulness ofsuch
information may be limited.
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Figure S. Forward Contract Volume for December Delivery

Captive Supply Considerations
A political controversy indirectly related to mandatory price reporting is the effort
to ban packer ownership of livestock, tied most recently to the 2002 farm bill. A key
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issue is whether packers should be allowed to own livestock for more than 14 days before
processing. A controversy surrounding the bill was the issue of"control" (Fuez et aI.,
2002), where various contracting arrangements could have been termed "ownership".
National reporting provides some information concerning the scope ofpacker ownership
as does the data from South Dakota A closely related issue is captive supplies of cattle.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards
Administration (USDA-GIPSA) defines captive supply as cattle owned, fed, or procured
more than 14 days prior to slaughter (GIPSA, 2002).
The packer owned cattle report provides a weekly breakdown ofthe number of
head slaughtered that were owned outright by packers and priced through forward
contracts or formulas. The weekly numbers were tallied for the first quarter of2002 and
compared with the total number ofhead of cattle slaughtered under federal inspection
during the quarter from UDSA-NASS. Those cattle not counted in the packer owned
report were classified as negotiated. As shown in figure 6, negotiated sales accounted for
60 percent ofthe number ofhead slaughtered. The next largest category was for formula
purchased cattle at 34 percent. Packer owned slaughter was 4 percent and forward
contract slaughter was 2 percent.
The packer owned percentage is consistant with the percentage ofpacker fed
purchases GIPSA (2002) reports for recent years. In addition, national cattle captive
supply has amounted to about 20 percent of slaughter in recent years (GIPSA, 2002).
Neither category seems to be growing, but the latter are perhaps more relevant to watch
from a market-efficiency standpoint.
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Packer Owned
40/0
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Contract
20/0
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Figure 6. 1st Quarter 2002 Cattle Slaughter Breakdown

South Dakota livestock industry people have expressed concern about the
common practice of20-day contacts in South Dakota and the 14-day breakouts in
national mandatory price reporting. The South Dakota mandatory reporting data shows
two distinct windows in the delivery dates ofthe cattle. There were about 900,000 head
ofcattle in the South Dakota data set. Ofthose, about 400,000 head were cows, bulls, or
missing a delivery date. Ofthe 500,000 head ofslaughter steers and heifers, about
400,000 had a delivery date within 7 days ofthe purchase and about 100,000 head
specified delivery within 20 days of purchase. The number ofhead under the 20-day
window would be classified as captive supply, suggesting a situation in South Dakota
similar to the national picture. The practice of20-day windows may also explain the
forward contract volume seen during December in figure 5.
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The 20-day forward contract delivery time seems like it may be of value to both
the packer and the producer. The packer may desire the long window to assure an
orderly supply fur slaughter. As such, packers may be willing to pay a premium for such
cattle. An at-the-money call option on a live cattle futures contact with 20 days until
expiration and an implied volatility level of 10 percent would be valued at about
$0.70/cwt. That is, upside price protection would cost packers $0.70/cwt. in the options
market and they might be willing to pay up to that amount for 20-day forward contracts.
Similar reasoning applies to producers. By entering into the short-term contract a
producer protects against any drop in price over the next 20 days, and a put option would
be valued at a similar amount. Empirically, it is too early to clearly decipher what might
be happening. A preliminary comparison shows the average difference between the 20
day contract prices and cash prices is less than $0.70.

Swine Reports
There was a smaller number of swine reports introduced relative to the cattle
reports. Direct hog prices are reported twice a day at the national, eastern combeIt,
western combeh, and IowaIMinnesota levels. The reports give head counts ofpurchases,
base prices, and state-specific breakdowns for the origins ofthe purchases. The base
price information is summarized in the prior day purchased reports with the same
geographic breakdowns. While the base price would give indications ofthe general
trends in the market, they are of limited usefulness when trying to discern location
specific demand. The sole weekly report covers non-carcass premiums. While
informative, nothing is specific enough for localized decision making.
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The most useful and informative report was not released consistently until after
the "3/60" guideline change. The prior day slaughtered swine report gives final prices
paid for swine under the different purchase arrangements instead ofjust base prices. The
prices subsequently feed into a daily lean hog carcass slaughter cost report. The prior day
slaughtered report gives the daily head count and average net price for the following
purchasing categories: negotiated (NEG), other market formula (OMF), swine or pork
market formula (SPMF), other purchase arrangement (OPA), and packer sold (PS). A
head count and slaughter characteristics are given for packer owned (PO) hogs, but a
price is not applicable for the category. A total weighted average price is also given for
the categories where producers sell to packers. That price should be comparable to the
lean hog index in terms of establishing price trends.
The average net prices for the different purchasing categories from Wednesdays
during the fourth quarter of 200 1 and the first quarter of 2002 are shown in figure 7. As
expected, the negotiated price shows the lowest lows and would presumably show the
highest highs. GAO (1999) suggests the spot market reflects swine oflower quality and
more weight variability. The formula prices tend to be higher than the negotiated prices,
and follow the latter's trend quite closely. The other purchase arrangement price tends to
behave differently, and appears to have been a smoothed out price during this time
period. The packer sold price tends to be the highest price, but the Wednesday chart
masks some daily variability. Perhaps such swine are sold in areas with a strong location
basis.
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Figure 7. Wednesday Direet Hog Priees

To further Wlderstand the relevance ofthe prices, the number of head under each
classification was tallied for the first quarter of2001. The daily totals were added and
compared to the federally inspected barrow and gilt slaughter for the first quarter. The
shares in each category are shown in figure 8. The total in the slaughtered swine report
was less than the federally inspected leve~ most likely because the former only covers
direct sales. Assuming that non-direct sales would be spot purchases from auctions, the
negotiated total reflects the residual after subtracting the classified category totals from
the federally inspected total.
Formula purchases acCOWlted for a majority slaughter volume. Negotiated
purchases, at 22 percent ofslaughter, are a much smaller percentage oftotal slaughter
compared to cattle purchases. Packer owned purchases, at 15 percent, make up a
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significantly larger percentage compared to cattle. The packer sold category, which
tended to have above average prices, only accounts for 2 percent ofslaughter.

PO

NEG

PS
20/0

OPA
8%

SPMF
42%

Figure 8. 1at Quarter 2002 Swine Slaughter Breakdown

Another informative aspect of the swine slaughtered report is the number ofswine
scheduled for delivery to packing plants. Each day the number scheduled for the
following two weeks is reported. The information should allow producers to gauge the
short-run supply situation ofpackers. Ifpackers are "short-bought" they may be more
likely to bid up cash purchases. If packers have a relatively large number of hogs already
arranged for slaughter, they may offer lower bids. To demonstrate how to use the
information, the average number of head scheduled for delivery was calculated on
Fridays during the first quarter of 2002. The number scheduled for the following week,
Monday through Friday, was used to compute the 2002 average shown in figure 9.
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Figure 9. Assessing Swine Scheduled for Delivery

The average number of head scheduled declines as one looks ahead through the

week. The report from April 26 was used to compare the situation on that day to the
average level scheduled. On April 26 packers had 20-30 percent more swine scheduled
than nonnal, i.e., they had plenty of hogs lined up for slaughter. One would not have

expected sharp increases in cash prices the following week. Had the levels been below
the average amounts, producer could have used the infonnation and waited for improved
bids.

Implications

The livestock industry in South Dakota has seen mixed results from national
mandatory price reporting. The immediate cost ofreporting has been the loss of some
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cattle price reports. However, the Sioux Falls price seems to reflect local activity well.
The information available surpasses the scope that was accessible to producers before
national reporting. At least at the national level, a comparison ofprices is possible across
possible purchasing methods. The short-run supply situation is also more transparent.
Packer ownership and captive supply can at least be observed and some oftheir
real or perceived price impacts can be examined with the available data. GAO (2002) has
recently noted that existing modeling efforts by USDA fail to account for such factors.
The analysis lays the groundwork for similar insights for other states and suggests
possible trends that may evolve at the national level once participants learn how reporting
works. Finally, further analysis may suggest improvements that could be made to the
price reporting laws at the national level. Given the limited life span ofthe national law,
an assessment of its perfonnance is relevant to pursue.
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